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Burgstahler and Eames (2003) present evidence that analysts commonly anticipate 
earnings management to avoid small losses, but often incorrectly predict its occurrence.  Here we 
consider whether the market’s behavior mimics that of analysts.  Our results suggest that analysts 
exhibit more forecast optimism in their zero earnings forecasts than in their other small earnings 
forecast levels, and markets exhibit less relative optimism at this point.  At the 271-360 day 
forecast horizon, we find a reduction in the earnings response coefficient at analysts’ zero 
earnings forecasts and interpret this as reflecting less optimism in market earnings forecasts than 
in analyst forecasts when analysts forecast zero earnings.  This evidence is consistent with the 
market not following analysts in erroneously predicting earnings management to avoid small 
losses.  We do not find similar evidence for shorter forecast horizons, suggesting that market and 
analyst forecasts converge towards the end of the year.  Finding differences in market and 
analyst earnings forecasts in this loss avoidance environment raises the possibility of differences 
in a variety of earnings management and other environments, and sends a general note of caution 
in using analyst forecasts issued early in the year to proxy market expectations.   
 
 
JEL Classification: M41, G14, G24,  
Keywords: analyst forecasts, earnings management, market forecasts, small losses. 
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Analyst vs. Market Forecasts and Earnings Management to Avoid Small Losses 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) present evidence of annual earnings management to avoid 
reporting small losses.  Subsequently, Burgstahler and Eames (2003) show that analysts 
anticipate this form of earning management in their earnings forecasts.  They find that late in the 
year analysts appear to correctly estimate the general extent of earnings management to avoid 
small losses, while  early in the year analysts over-estimate the extent of such earnings 
management.  They also find that analysts are particularly prone to misidentifying the specific 
instances of this form of earnings management.  Analysts exhibit an unusually high level of 
forecast optimism in their zero earnings forecasts (consistent with the prediction of earnings 
management that is not realized) and an unusually high level of forecast pessimism for zero 
earnings realizations (consistent with a failure to predict earnings management that is realized).   
 We examine whether investors (i.e., markets) and analysts have similar difficulties in 
correctly anticipating earnings management to avoid small losses when analysts are exhibiting 
such difficulties (i.e., when analysts forecast zero earnings and when firms report zero earnings).  
In other words, we consider whether investors are aware of and adjust for the observed biases in 
analysts’ forecasts at zero analyst forecasts and zero earnings.  
 Researchers often use analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for market expectations.  
Here we consider the efficacy of this proxy in settings reflecting earnings management to avoid 
small losses and analysts’ anticipation of such management.  We recognize that instances of zero 
earnings forecasts are not particularly common and zero earnings realizations are even less so, 
and thus the economic significance of any differences in analyst and market expectations of 
earnings at these points may be modest.  However, we target differences in analyst and investor 
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perceptions of earnings management to avoid small losses for two primary reasons: (1) this 
provides a relatively simplified setting1 and consequently a directly tractable early step in the 
comparison of analyst and investor expectations in relation to management to benchmarks 
 and (2) this builds directly on prior research by Burgstahler and Eames (2003).  If market and 
analyst perceptions differ in this particular environment, associated with the benchmark of loss 
avoidance, then perceptions can differ at other points as well and evidence of a difference can 
send a general note of caution in using analyst forecasts to proxy market expectations.   
Comparing market adjusted returns across analyst earnings forecast levels near zero, we 
find relatively high returns at zero analysts’ forecasts, especially at the 271-360 day forecast 
horizon.  We also find that at the 271-360 day forecast horizon, but not at shorter horizons, the 
earnings response coefficient at zero analysts’ earnings forecasts is less than at other small 
analyst forecast levels.  We interpret these results as indicative of the market exhibiting less 
relative earnings forecast optimism than analysts when analysts forecast zero earnings early in 
the year.  The general absence of significant returns differences and shifts in the earnings 
response coefficients at shorter forecast horizons is consistent with a convergence of analyst and 
market expectations over time for zero analyst forecasts.  At zero earnings realizations we 
observe, at best, modest evidence of relatively higher returns and a relatively positive earnings 
response coefficient only at the 271-360 day forecast horizon.  With an inability to identify a 
significant differential in analyst forecast bias at zero earnings and this horizon, we cannot assert 
that the market is attempting to undo analyst bias at this point.  The increased earnings response 
coefficient at this horizon may represent the market’s own bias at zero earnings realizations.   
                                                 
1 The other major earnings benchmarks, prior period earnings and analyst forecasts, are subject to managerial 
influence which is not the case with the zero benchmark.  
  
    4
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a brief discussion of the 
research issues. Section 3 presents our methodology.  Section 4 identifies our data and section 5 
presents our results.  A final section concludes with a summary and suggestions for future 
research. 
II. RESEARCH ISSUES  
 
This section presents a limited review of the literature relating to earnings management to 
avoid small losses and analysts’ awareness of this behavior. We subsequently consider the 
equivalency of analyst and market expectations, and link this to our goal of assessing whether 
markets match analysts in their expectations of earnings management to avoid small losses.     
Numerous studies (Hayn 1995, Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, DeGeorge, Patel, and 
Zechauser 1999) document a discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings, showing an 
unexpectedly high frequency of small positive observations and an unexpectedly low frequency 
of small negative observations, and interpret this discontinuity as evidence of earnings 
management to avoid small losses. Others have questioned the appropriateness of interpreting 
the observed discontinuity in the earnings distribution as evidence of earnings management.  
Dechow, et al. (2003) are unable to link discretionary accruals management to the observed 
anomaly for U.S. firms, but Gore, et al. (2007) confirm the link for U.K. firms.  Beaver, et al. 
(2007) point out that the anomaly may not be entirely due to earnings management.  Their 
analyses suggest that the asymmetric treatment of income taxes and special items for profit and 
loss firms explains approximately two-thirds of the discontinuity in the distribution of annual net 
income.  Conversely, Burgstahler and Eames (2003) present evidence suggesting that 
extraordinary, nonrecurring, and special items are not significantly contributing to the anomaly.2  
                                                 
2 See note 14, Burgstahler and Eames (2003) 
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Durtschi and Easton (2005) find no anomaly in the distribution of unscaled annual basic EPS 
including extraordinary and discontinued items, and interpret this finding as evidence that the 
anomaly observed in prior studies employing earnings scaled by price or market capitalization  
may be due to the deflation factor rather than the properties of earnings per se.3  Jacob and 
Jorgensen (2007) find a significant anomaly at zero earnings for scaled annual earnings ending in 
the fourth but not the other fiscal quarters.  With this, they provide convincing evidence that the 
basic anomaly presented in the earlier studies cannot be attributed primarily to scaling or the 
asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses.  Earnings management appears to be the most 
plausible explanation for the previously observed anomalies.   
Burgstahler and Eames (2003) consider whether analysts predict earnings management to 
avoid losses.  They present evidence that analysts both anticipate this management and are 
unable to consistently identify the specific firms that are managing earnings to avoid small 
losses.  Specifically, they find unusual forecast optimism at zero earnings forecasts (consistent 
with analysts predicting earnings management when no such management occurs), and unusual 
forecast pessimism at zero earnings realizations (consistent with analysts failing to forecast 
earnings management when it does occur).  
Analysts are tasked with providing public forecasts of future income statement, cash 
flow, and balance sheet amounts, as well as trading recommendations and target prices (Bonini et 
al. 2010, Simon and Curtis 2011).  A number of studies have linked analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors with their incentives and cognitive difficulties within this environment.  Francis and 
Philbrick (1993), Lim (1998), and Das et al. (1998) suggest that analysts issue intentionally 
                                                 
3 Burgstahler (2004) presents evidence that the Durtschi and Easton results are likely driven by a large number of firms 
with low share prices (i.e., less than $1.50/share) and associated lower incentives and higher costs for engaging in 
earnings management.    
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optimistic earnings forecasts in order to please management and thus obtain greater access to 
managers’ private information.  Here we have instances where analysts are perceived to not issue 
forecasts that accurately reflect their earnings expectations.  Gu and Wu (2003) argue that in an 
effort to minimize mean absolute forecast error, analysts forecast median rather than mean 
earnings.  This leads to forecast bias when the distribution of earnings is skewed.  They find that 
earnings skewness is significantly related to analyst forecast optimism.   Eames et al. (2002) 
identify a cognitive bias they call the “objectivity illusion” where analysts’ forecast errors are 
predictably associated with their outstanding recommendations at the time of the forecast.  
Investors serve as consumers of analyst outputs, and are neither compensated for nor prone to 
publically disclose their expectations.  Considering the differences in analyst and investor roles 
and reward structures, we anticipate that investors’ earnings perceptions can differ significantly 
from reported analyst forecasts. 
While the use of analyst forecasts to proxy for investor expectations is a widespread 
practice in the accounting and finance literature, relatively few studies have directly considered 
differences between analyst and investor earnings expectations.  Abarbanell et al. (1995) present 
a theoretical model where investor beliefs reflect both their private information and analyst 
forecasts.  In this model, as the dispersion in analyst forecasts increases investors place relatively 
more weight on their private information, which leads to the potential for more measurement 
error when employing the mean analyst forecast as a proxy for investor beliefs.  Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) present evidence consistent with markets doing a better job than analysts in 
anticipating the future earnings implications of meeting or beating analysts’ current earnings 
expectations.  Athanasakou et al. (2011) consider returns and subsequent analyst forecasts in 
response to firms achieving analysts’ current earnings expectations, and find inconsistencies 
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suggestive of differences in market and analyst expectations of future earnings. Elgers, et al. 
(2003) find that the accruals related bias in market earnings expectations exceeds that in analyst 
earnings forecasts.  Conversely, Kang and Yoo (2007) find that analysts overreact more strongly 
than the market to current accruals.  Hughes, et al. (2008) compare predictable market returns 
and predictable analyst forecast errors, and conclude that analyst earnings forecasts can be a poor 
proxy for market expectations.   
Other studies consider whether markets adjust for perceived bias in analyst forecasts.  
Keung et al. (2010) find that the earnings response coefficient for earnings surprises in the range 
from zero to one cent is less than for adjacent ranges.  They interpret this as evidence of investor 
skepticism towards zero and small positive earnings surprises, but the results can also reflect 
discrepancies in analyst and investor earnings expectations.4  Their evidence is consistent with 
firms managing analyst but not investor earnings expectations downward to achieve positive 
earnings surprises.  Easton and Sommers (2007) find that the implied expected rate of return 
based on current earnings and on realized future earnings are not significantly different, and are 
significantly less than the implied expected rate based on analysts’ earnings forecasts.  From this, 
they conclude that the market sees through the general optimistic bias in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  Gu and Wu (2003) find that the market adjusts for part of the skewness-induced bias 
they identify in analyst forecast.  Das et al. (2007) find that markets place relatively greater 
reliance on management as opposed to analyst forecasts when the management forecasts are 
more conservative than analyst forecasts.  Pinello (2008) considers an experimental setting and 
                                                 
4 When firms achieve the zero earnings benchmark, but not necessarily when analysts forecast zero earnings, it is 
reasonable to assume some earnings management related skepticism on the part of investors.  Then investors may be 
particular skeptical of, as well as assign a premium to, achieving the zero earnings benchmark.  These factors serve 
to counteract one another, and may account for the Hermann, et al. (2011) finding that zero earnings does not elicit a 
special net response by investors. 
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finds that student investors appear to recognize and adjust their earnings expectations for 
perceived biases in analyst forecasts.  Pinello further points out that similar behavior by real 
investors may explain the observed asymmetrically strong capital market reactions to positive 
and negative earnings surprises.  Here we consider potential differences in analyst and market 
expectations in the context of achieving the benchmark of zero earnings, where we know 
analysts exhibit some difficulty in identifying those firms managing earnings to achieve the 
benchmark.   
The above literature suggests that markets may often exhibit superior forecasting 
performance relative to analysts.  While Burgstahler and Eames (2003) find that earnings 
management to avoid a loss periodically fools analysts, fooling the market is another matter.     
Here we consider whether the market possesses the ability to correctly anticipate such earnings 
management under circumstances where we know analysts are having difficulties anticipating 
this management, i.e., when analysts forecast zero earnings and when firms report zero earnings.    
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Our analyses are grounded in Burgstahler and Eames’s (2003) model of earnings 
management  and analysts’ forecasts of earnings management to avoid losses.  Here we elaborate 
on their model and identify our means for comparing analyst and market expectations of earnings 
management to avoid losses when analysts forecast zero earnings and when firms report zero 
realized earnings.    
Burgstahler and Eames (2003) model reported earnings as a function of both pre-
managed earnings and a firm-year specific earnings management threshold point, below which 
earnings will not be managed to avoid reporting a loss.   For pre-managed earnings falling in the 
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interval from this threshold point to zero earnings, earnings will be managed to avoid a loss.  
Outside this range, the firm will report pre-managed earnings and not engage in earnings 
management to avoid a loss.  Burgstahler and Eames presume that analysts develop their 
earnings forecasts in much the same manner, as a function of their pre-management earnings 
expectation and assessment of the earnings management threshold.  Thus, earnings forecast 
errors are a function of the error in analyst predictions of pre-managed earnings and error in 
analyst assessments of firm-year specific earnings management thresholds. 
Using this model, Burgstahler and Eames initially assume that analysts accurately 
forecast pre-managed earnings and consider the effect of errors in assessing the earnings 
management threshold on earnings forecast errors at zero reported earnings and zero forecast 
earnings.  Then if analysts accurately assess the earnings management threshold there will be no 
forecast error at zero forecast and reported earnings.  Alternatively, if analysts anticipate a lower 
(i.e., more negative) than realized earnings management threshold, they will anticipate 
management in instances in which it does not occur (i.e., in the range of pre-managed earnings 
levels between the anticipated and realized threshold level) and obtain systematic forecast 
optimism in their zero earnings forecasts.  Finally, if they anticipate a higher (i.e., less negative) 
than realized earnings management threshold, they will not anticipate management in instances 
where it occurs (i.e., in the range of pre-managed earnings levels between the realized threshold 
and the anticipated threshold).  This leads to systematic forecast pessimism at zero reported 
earnings.  Finding relative optimism and pessimism at zero forecasts and realized earnings, 
respectively, Burgstahler and Eames conclude that analysts exhibit difficulties in correctly 
assessing firm-year specific earnings management to avoid reporting a loss. 
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Burtgstahler and Eames subsequently assume that analysts accurately forecast the 
earnings management threshold and consider the effect of errors in forecasts of pre-managed 
earnings on reported earnings forecast errors at zero reported earnings and zero forecast earnings.     
If analysts’ forecasts of pre-managed earnings and realized earnings both fall in the interval from 
the earnings management threshold to zero earnings, we have zero forecast error, even if there is 
error in the forecast of pre-managed earnings.  If the forecast of pre-managed earnings falls in 
this same interval (i.e., analysts report a zero earnings forecast) but realized pre-managed 
earnings is below the earnings management threshold or above zero, we have forecast optimism 
and pessimism, respectively.  Alternatively, if realized pre-managed earnings falls in the interval 
from the threshold to zero (i.e., the firm reports zero earnings) but the forecast of pre-managed 
earnings is below the threshold or above zero, we have forecast pessimism and optimism, 
respectively.  Thus we have no simple unconditional hypotheses regarding the effect of pre-
managed earnings prediction errors on forecast errors at zero forecasts and realized earnings.   
The model of Burgstahler and Eames (2003) applies equally well to market expectations 
of pre-managed earnings and market forecasts of threshold levels below which earnings 
management to avoid a loss is not expected.  While the market provides no explicit earnings 
forecasts where one can assess differential optimism or pessimism at zero earnings realizations 
and at zero analyst forecasts, there is a long and extensive literature linking earnings surprises 
and returns (Ball and Brown 1968, Hughes and Ricks 1987, Lopez and Rees 2004, Strong and 
Walker 1993).5  An analysis of market returns can provide insights into market earnings 
surprises, and thus relative optimism and pessimism in market expectations.  While we cannot 
identify instances of markets forecasting zero earnings, analysis of returns at zero analyst 
                                                 
5 The lack of explicit market forecasts has typically lead researchers to employ time series models and analyst 
forecasts to obtain proxies for market earnings expectations. 
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forecasts at least affords us the opportunity to assess whether market and analyst expectations are 
generally consistent at this point.  Similarly, consideration of returns at zero earnings realizations 
enables us to consider analyst and market consistency at this point.   
We employ two approaches for comparing analyst and market earnings expectations at 
zero analyst forecasts and zero earnings realizations.  Both approaches consider forecasts and 
returns  at various forecast horizons.  We consider the median forecast for each of four forecast 
horizons, respectively defined as 1 to 90 ( medianE 90,1ˆ ), 91 to 180(
medianE 180,91ˆ ), 181 to 270(
medianE 270,181ˆ ), and 
271 to 360 ( medianE 360,271ˆ ) days prior to the earnings release date reported by Compustat.  The related 
returns intervals are from 1, 90, 180, and 270 days before to one day after the earnings release 
date.  At the three longer horizons we begin the returns interval the day after the end of the 
forecast interval.  For the 1 to 90 day forecast horizon, we begin the returns interval the day 
before the earnings announcement, i.e., the day the forecast interval ends.  This yields three-day 
returns, and has the ability to capture information leakage prior to the earnings announcement.  
The use of three-day returns can be problematic only if a forecast is issued on the day before the 
earnings announcement.  For each firm-year, we also consider the single last forecast ( lastE 360,1ˆ ) 
issued by any analyst in the period up to 360 days before the earnings release date, and the 
related returns interval from the day before to the day after the earnings release date.   
In our first approach, we compare returns across earnings and analyst forecast intervals in 
the vicinity of zero to determine if the pattern of relative returns is consistent with the previously 
observed analyst forecast optimism (pessimism) at zero forecasted (reported) earnings.  Here we 
focus on market adjusted returns relative to the CRSP value-weighted index.  If markets 
correctly adjust for analyst forecast bias when analysts forecast zero earnings, returns at zero 
forecasted earnings will be similar to returns at other earnings forecast intervals near zero.  If 
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market expectations are consistent with the relative analyst forecast optimism observed at zero 
analyst forecasts, we should observe relatively more negative (or less positive) returns at this 
point in comparison to other small analyst earnings forecast levels, because the markets’ earnings 
surprise will be less positive.  Similarly, if markets correctly adjust for analyst forecast bias at 
zero reported earnings, returns at zero reported earnings will be similar to returns at other 
earnings intervals near zero.  However, if market expectations are consistent with the relative 
analyst forecast pessimism observed at zero earnings realizations, we expect relatively more 
positive (or less negative) returns at this point in comparison to other small levels of earnings 
realizations.     
As a second approach for considering the market’s anticipation of earnings management 
to avoid small losses, we model market returns as a function of forecast error, dummy variables 
relating to analysts’ zero forecasts (D1) and zero earnings realizations (D2), a number of control 
variables, and interactions of these variables with forecast error.  Here we include a dummy 
variable (DMBE) to control for a returns premium to meeting or beating the analyst forecasts 
(Bartov et al. 2002), and another dummy variable (DLOSS) to control for Hayn’s (1995) finding 
that the returns-earnings association is attenuated by firm losses.  The additional control 
variables for market to book ratio, leverage, beta, size, and earnings persistence follow the 
definitions in Lopez and Rees (2002).   Omitting firm and year subscripts for the sake of brevity, 
our resulting models are: 
RET = ß0 + ß1 * FE + ß2 * FE * D1 + ß3 * DLOSS + ß4* DMBE + ß5* MB + ß6*LEV  
+ ß7*BETA + ß8 * SIZE + ß9 * PERSIST + ß10 * FE* DLOSS + ß11 * FE* DMBE  
+ ß12 * FE* MB + ß13 * FE* LEV + ß14 * FE* BETA + ß15 * FE* SIZE  
+ ß16 * FE* PERSIST + e               (1) 
and   
RET = ß0 + ß1 * FE + ß2 * FE * D2 + ß3 * DLOSS + ß4* DMBE + ß5* MB  + ß6*LEV  
+ ß7* BETA + ß8 * SIZE + ß9 * PERSIST +  ß10 * FE* DLOSS  +  ß11 * FE* DMBE  
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+  ß12 * FE* MB +  ß13 * FE* LEV +  ß14 * FE* BETA +  ß15 * FE* SIZE  
+  ß16 * FE* PERSIST +  e               (2) 
 
These equations differ only in the inclusion of the dummy variables reflecting zero 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (D1=1, and 0 otherwise) and zero earnings realizations (D2=1, and 0 
otherwise).  The remaining variables are defined as follows: 
RET = the market adjusted return (relative to CRSP value-weighted index) in the interval from 
the day after the end of a forecast interval of interest to the day after the earnings release 
date,6  
FE = reported less forecasted earnings scaled by the market value of equity. 
DLOSS = 1 if earnings is less than zero, otherwise = 0, 
DMBE = 1 if FE is > 0, otherwise = 0, 
MB  =  the market to book equity ratio at the end of the year, 
LEV = long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt plus preferred and common equity, 
BETA = market beta based on CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets, and 
PERSIST = indicator variable for earnings persistence, measured based on the E/P ratio decile -- 
1 for the decile rankings 3 through 8 and 0 for the rankings 1, 2, 9, and 10. 
 
In regressing returns on analyst forecast errors, we examine the validity of using analyst 
forecasts as a surrogate for market earnings expectations at analyst forecasts of zero earnings and 
at zero earnings realizations.  If analysts’ relative forecast optimism or pessimism at these points 
is shared by investors and provides no unusually biased estimates of investor expectations, then 
we expect no differences in the earnings response coefficients at zero analyst forecasts and zero 
reported earnings.  If, however, market expectations are unusually different from analysts’ as 
analysts forecast zero earnings or at zero realized earnings we can expect a difference in the 
earnings response coefficients at these points.   
Here we consider an environment characterized by small levels of analysts’ forecasts and 
realized earnings.  Burgstahler and Eames (2003) find that analysts are generally optimistic 
                                                 
6 We also considered analyses using Jensens’ alpha from the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French 
1993) and obtained consistent results.  Due to the inherent inability of this second measure to consider our shortest 
forecast horizons and for brevity, we limit our presentation to analyses of market adjusted returns. 
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across these levels of forecasts and earnings realizations.  If investors are especially less 
optimistic than analysts when analysts forecast zero earnings we should observe a decrease in the 
earnings response coefficient for analysts’ zero earnings forecasts, for the returns response will 
result from the investors’ surprise, which will be smaller than the analysts’ surprise measured 
relative to the analyst forecasts.  On the other hand, if analyst expectations are particularly less 
optimistic at zero realized earnings and investor expectations are not less optimistic to the same 
degree, the earnings response coefficient will be greater, because the returns will reflect the 
investors’ surprise, which will be greater than the analysts’ surprise we employ in our 
regressions.   
If the market mimics the analysts’ unusual forecast optimism at zero forecasts and 
unusual forecast pessimism in zero realized earnings, we will not observe earnings response 
coefficient differentials at these points.  Presuming that observed returns reflect the gap between 
realized earnings and the market’s prediction of earnings, tests of the coefficients β2 in equations 
(1) and (2) will provide evidence regarding any differences in prediction between the market and 
analysts.     
 
IV. DATA  
 
We obtain actual and forecast annual earnings per share values from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) for the period 1983-2007.  I/B/E/S reports actual earnings 
and broker-analyst earnings forecasts in a manner consistent with I/B/E/S’s perceived treatment 
by the majority of analysts following a specific firm.  If an individual analyst reports in a manner 
inconsistent with this majority then I/B/E/S makes an effort to not include the forecast in the 
database.  This approach permits discrepancies in the measurement of earnings across firms, but 
I/B/E/S reports that with few exceptions analysts forecast operating earnings of a recurring 
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nature.  For each firm and fiscal year, the I/B/E/S database includes forecasts released at various 
dates by a number of analysts.  To insure comparability of forecast and “actual” earnings, all 
comparisons are based on the forecast and earnings values reported by I/B/E/S. 
As in Burgstahler and Eames (2003), we scale all earnings and forecast per share values 
from I/B/E/S by the I/B/E/S reported stock price at the beginning of the year.  We restrict our 
analyses to forecasts of annual earnings that meet the following requirements: 
(1) the earnings announcement date and prior year market value are available from  
Compustat, 
(2)  the firms are neither utilities (SIC codes 4400 to 4999) nor financial(SIC codes 
6000 to 6499),  
(3) the forecast release date is within 360 days of the Compustat earnings 
announcement date, 
(4)  the earnings announcement date is not more than 150 days after fiscal year end, 
and  
(5) actual earnings is available from I/B/E/S.   
Financial and utility firms are excluded from the analysis by requirement (2) to eliminate firms 
subject to earnings management incentives related to unusual regulatory and other factors.  
Requirement (4) eliminates those few firms which report unusually late, as our classification of 
forecast horizons relative to the announcement date makes these cases difficult to interpret.  Our 
sample is further restricted by the requirement for CRSP returns.     
We focus on last forecasts before the earnings announcement date, and median forecasts 
in four 90-day intervals (forecast horizons) preceding the earnings announcement date.  Our 
median forecast observations reflect a minimum of three individual forecasts for a firm-year and 
horizon combination.  We conduct individual analyses by forecast horizon, and thus construct 
separate samples for each horizon.  When we focus on relative forecast errors and returns at zero 
vs. small non-zero forecast levels, we limit our samples to observations where the forecasts fall 
in the range from  -5% to +5% of market value, but permit realized earnings to assume any 
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value.  We contend that comparing forecast errors and returns at zero earnings forecasts with 
these same measures for very large positive or negative earnings forecasts can distort our 
analyses and provide little or erroneous insights.  Similar arguments can be made in the case of 
comparisons across realized earnings levels.  For these samples, we limit realized earnings to + 
5% of market value, but permit the forecasts to assume any value.  
Table 1 Panel A provides our sample sizes by forecast horizon and test.  The sample sizes 
for the returns distributions tests are determined by the availability of stock return information 
and forecast or realized earnings in the range from 5% to -5% of market value.  The number of 
sample observations is further reduced for the regression analyses due to the availability of the 
control variables.  For the sample of last forecasts issued by any analyst before the earnings 
announcement, the mean and median days between the last forecast and the earnings release date 
are 45 and 23 days, respectively.  Ninety percent of last forecasts precede the earnings release 
date by no more than 109 days, while 25% of last forecasts are within 9 days of the earnings 
release date. To provide insights regarding our samples we focus on the distribution comparison 
sample at the 1-90 day horizons.  Table 1 Panels B and C present the frequency distributions of 
years and industries for the 1-90 day distribution comparison sample.  The number of 
observations per year grows substantially over time, with a jump in 1997 and 1998, and a 
subsequent decline.  The majority of these observations are from manufacturing firms.  Table 1 
Panel D presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of the number of forecasts 
contributing to the median forecast for the distribution comparison samples at each forecast 
horizon.  Relatively fewer forecasts contribute to the median in the last 90-day forecast interval 
before the earnings announcement.  Prior to this forecast interval, the number of forecasts 
remains quite constant with a median of 7 for all preceding 90-day forecast periods. 
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V.  RESULTS 
Introduction  
We organize our results into three sections. In the first, we present evidence regarding 
whether our data reflects earnings management and analysts’ anticipation of earnings 
management in a manner similar to the evidence in Burgstahler and Eames (2003).  We 
subsequently consider evidence regarding differences in returns across small and zero levels of 
forecasts and earnings.  Finally, we examine whether the association between returns and analyst 
forecast errors exhibits unusual behavior at zero earnings and zero forecast observations.   
Our results suggest continuous trends in the patterns observed across forecast horizons 
during the year.  For brevity, our presentation and discussion of results often focus on the last 
forecasts among all the analysts for a firm-year observation and median forecasts for the 91 to 
180 day and 271 to 360 day periods prior to the earnings release date.   
Evidence of Realized and Anticipated Earnings Management to Avoid Small Losses 
Since our sample differs from that of Burgstahler and Eames (2003) by the use of a 
different database of analyst forecasts, the addition of data for the years 1983 through 1985 and 
1997 through 2007, and the requirement for returns data, we first check our sample for evidence 
of earnings management to avoid losses and evidence that analysts anticipate such management.  
Figure 1 presents frequency distributions for realized earnings as well as forecast earnings, 
employing an interval width of 0.005 and range of  -0.03 to +0.03, where the intervals are 
defined to include their lower boundaries and exclude their upper boundaries.  The distributions 
for realized and forecast earnings and results of significance tests (not reported) mimic those 
reported by Burgstahler and Eames (2003).  
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To ascertain whether analysts correctly anticipate instances of earnings management to 
avoid small losses, Burgstahler and Eames consider quartiles of forecast error by both earnings 
levels and forecast levels.  For consistency with Burgstahler and Eames (2003), and because 
comparisons at the quartile levels may offer greater insight than is readily available from 
comparisons of means and medians alone, we replicate their approach.  Figure 2 and Table 2 
present analyst annual forecast error quartiles for intervals of scaled forecast earnings from -.03 
to .03.  Here we use the same .005 interval width as in Figure 1, but separately report results for 
exact zero forecasts.   For all forecast horizons we observe evidence of greater forecast optimism 
(i.e., more negative forecast error), reflected in the lower and median quartiles of the 
distributions of forecast error at zero earnings forecasts than for surrounding intervals of earnings 
forecasts.  To assess the statistical significance of the effects observed in the forecast error 
quartiles at zero earnings forecasts, we employ the quartile difference statistic outlined in 
Burgstahler and Eames (2003), equal to the quartile value for an earnings forecast interval less 
the average of the corresponding quartile values for the two immediately adjacent forecast 
intervals.  We assess the significance of these statistics on the basis of one-tailed approximate 
randomization tests (Noreen 1989).7  These tests indicate the first quartile and median values for 
all forecast horizons are significantly less than for the adjacent earnings forecast intervals (p < 
.001).   
Figure 3 and Table 3 present analyst forecast error quartiles for intervals of reported 
earnings, again employing the range from -.03 to .03, an interval width of .005, and separately 
                                                 
7 These tests assess significance based on a reference distribution generated by calculating test statistic values under 
conditions where the null hypothesis of no differences in returns distributions across forecast categories holds by 
construction.  We generated 999 realizations of the test statistic using randomization procedure.  The computed 
significance level of the original observed value of each quartile difference is assessed using a one-tailed test for the 
alternative hypothesis, assessed as (1+ number of randomly generated pseudo-quartile differences < QDi)/(1+999). 
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identifying exact zero earnings realizations.  Here we observe modest to no relative forecast 
pessimism at zero earnings.  Like Burgstahler and Eames (2003), we observe no substantial 
forecast pessimism at the 271-360 day horizon, and then only modest and sporadic indications of 
relative pessimism for zero reported earnings at the shorter forecast horizons.  Among our 
quartile difference statistics, only for the upper quartile for last forecasts and the lower quartile 
for 91-180 day forecasts do we obtain significant evidence of relative forecast pessimism at zero 
reported earnings (p=.005 and .095, respectively).  Burgstahler and Eames (2003) obtain 
significant quartile difference statistics only for the median and third quartile of last forecasts and 
the third quartile of 1-90 day forecasts.  They do not present results for 91-180 day forecasts.  
Comparing our results with those of Burgstahler and Eames (2003), we find consistency in 
significance only for the upper quartile of last forecasts and less apparent pessimism in our data 
than theirs.  This latter finding may be attributable to our data including a substantial proportion 
of more recent observations and a diminution over time in relative analyst forecast pessimism at 
zero reported earnings.  Collectively our results provide significant evidence of relative analyst 
forecast optimism at zero forecasts for all forecast horizons.  The evidence of relative analyst 
forecast pessimism at zero earnings realizations is weak at best.   
Comparisons of Returns across Small and Zero Forecasts and Earnings  
  To gain insights into the market’s expectation of earnings management to avoid small 
losses and see if it is consistent with analysts’ optimism at zero forecasts, Figure 4 and Table 4 
present quartiles of market adjusted returns at various forecast horizons for analysts’ earnings 
forecast levels in the vicinity of zero.  At all forecast horizons we observe relatively higher 
returns at zero forecasts in the lower quartiles, though this is significant only for the last and 271-
360 day horizons (p=.013 and .001, respectively).   The median values for the last and 271-360 
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day horizons also suggest relatively higher returns at zero forecasts, but the value is significant 
only for the 271-360 day forecast (p=.048).   The relatively higher market adjusted returns at 
zero analyst earnings forecasts than for the adjacent forecast levels are consistent with relatively 
less market optimism at this point and contrast with the relative optimism manifest in analysts’ 
forecasts of zero earnings.  This diminution in market optimism at zero analyst forecasts could be 
the result of markets excessively adjusting for a perceived differential optimism in analyst 
forecasts of zero earnings.  It is certainly not consistent with markets following analysts when 
analysts are incorrectly anticipating earnings management to avoid small losses.  
A comparison of market returns across earnings levels addresses whether markets exhibit 
the same pattern of forecast errors we observe for analysts in Figure 3 and Table 3.  To consider 
market returns across earnings levels and time horizons, Figure 5 and Table 5 present quartiles of 
market adjusted returns for earnings intervals in the vicinity of zero.  For last forecasts we 
observe significantly lower returns in the upper quartile at zero realized earnings (p=.009) than in 
the adjacent realized earnings intervals.  At the 91-180 day horizon we observe mixed results and 
no significance in any of the quartile values.  At the 271-360 day horizon we observe higher 
returns in all the quartile values, but this difference is significant only in the first quartile 
(p=.017).   Our results are modestly supportive of markets exhibiting relative pessimism for zero 
earnings realizations early in the year and then relative optimism late in the year.  Given the 
weak results from our quartile difference tests for analyst forecast errors and returns across 
earnings levels, it is difficult to draw general conclusions with respect to zero realized earnings.   
Analysis of the Association between Forecast Error and Returns 
The preceding tests consider market returns across levels of earnings forecasts and 
realized earnings.  These present the opportunity to assess market earnings forecast optimism and 
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pessimism across analyst forecast and realized earnings levels, but provide no direct comparisons 
of market and analyst expectations.  Our second set of tests offers the opportunity to compare 
market and analyst expectations at analysts’ zero earnings forecasts and zero realized earnings. 
We thus turn our attention to the existence of a differential behavior in the association 
between analyst forecast errors and returns at zero earnings and analysts’ zero earnings forecasts.  
Table 6 Panel A presents estimation results for equation (1), which incorporates a number of 
control variables and a dummy variable to permit the earnings response coefficient to differ at 
analysts’ zero earnings forecasts.  Estimating equation (1) for our five forecast horizons, we find 
a preponderance of non-significant coefficient estimates at the shorter forecast horizons.  For the 
three longest horizons we obtain significantly positive coefficient estimates for FE.8  The 
coefficient estimate for FE*D1 is significantly negative at the 1% level for the 271-360 day 
horizon, and non-significant at the other horizons.  This reduction in the earnings response 
coefficient for analysts’ zero earnings forecasts at the 271-360 day horizon suggests an increase 
in the difference between analyst and market expectations at this point.  The increased difference 
at our longest forecast horizon is consistent with analysts early in the year being unusually more 
optimistic than markets when analysts are forecasting zero earnings.  Collectively, our results 
suggest a significant difference in market and analyst expectations early in the year, and a 
subsequent convergence of expectations during the year.     
 Table 6 Panel B presents estimation results for equation (2), where the dummy variable 
permits the earnings response coefficient to differ at zero realized earnings.  Again, the 
explanatory power of the equations and the frequency of significant coefficients tends to increase 
with a lengthening of the forecast horizons.  Surprisingly, the coefficient estimate for the forecast 
                                                 
8 Significance levels in these and all subsequently reported regressions are determined via clustering errors at the 
firm and year levels (Petersen 2009). 
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error is negative and significant for the 1-90 day horizon.  This is likely due to the inclusion of 
FE*DMBE in the regression.  In a simpler model at this horizon, including only FE and FE*D2 
as independent variables, the coefficient estimate on forecast error is positive and significant at 
the one percent level.  In the full model, note that the coefficient on FE*DMBE is positive, 
significant, and of greater magnitude than the coefficient on FE, netting a positive coefficient for 
firms that meet or beat the analyst forecast.  The coefficient estimates for FE*D2 are neither 
positive nor significant at all forecast horizons shorter than 271-360 days.  While in Table 2 we 
identify a modest level of relative pessimism in analyst forecasts of zero earnings only at the 
shortest forecast horizons, now it is only at the 271-360 day horizon that we have a positive and 
modestly significant (10% level) coefficient estimate for the interaction term.  The significant 
coefficient on FE*D2 at the 271-360 day horizon might be capturing the market’s attempt to 
undo analyst bias if the analyst bias exists.  Given that we do not find such analyst bias, the 
positive coefficient on FE*D2 may represent the market’s own bias.   
Institutional Ownership and Differences between Analyst and Investor Expectations 
 We previously outlined why and how analysts’ reported and market earnings 
expectations might differ.  Differences between market and analyst expectations may increase or 
decrease with the level of investor sophistication.  Here we consider the role of institutional 
ownership in influencing the difference between analyst and investor expectations at zero 
forecasts and zero earnings realizations.  Sophisticated institutional investors may more closely 
follow their private information, and thus increase the difference between analyst and investor 
expectations, or they may more closely follow analysts than the average investor, thus decreasing 
the differences.  That is, institutional investor ownership could contribute to or diminish the 
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differences between analyst and market expectations.  Thus, we have no directional hypothesis 
for institutional ownership.   
 To consider the impact of institutional ownership, we focus on the 271-360 day forecast 
horizon, for only at this horizon did we find significant coefficient estimates for ß2 in equations 
(1) and (2).  In our initial approach to assessing this impact, we define the variable IO (=1 for 
institutional ownership greater than the median value of 43%, and zero otherwise), and add this 
variable and the interaction terms D1*IO, FE*IO, and FE*D1*IO to equation (1) and the terms 
D2*IO, FE*IO, and FE*D2*IO to equation (2).  We find the coefficient estimates for FE*D1*IO 
and FE*D2*IO at the 271-360 day forecast horizon are negative but not significant.9  In 
additional tests, we split the sample at the median value of fractional institutional ownership, 
estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for the two samples, and focus on the coefficient 
estimates for FE*D1 and FE*D2.  The coefficient estimates for FE*D1 are significantly negative 
for both the high and low ownership samples.  In neither sample was the coefficient estimate for 
FE*D2 significant.  These results are consistent with our results in Table 6, but are not consistent 
with institutional ownership contributing to a significant difference in analyst and investor 
expectations at zero analyst forecasts and zero realized earnings.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Burgstahler and Eames (2003) find annual analyst earnings forecasts are relatively 
optimistic when they forecast zero earnings, and relatively pessimistic for observations of zero 
realized earnings.  They interpret these results as consistent with analysts commonly forecasting 
earnings management to avoid small losses when such management is not occurring, and 
analysts failing to correctly anticipate instances of such management.  The focus of our study is 
                                                 
9 Employing the same regression to the shorter forecast horizons, we again find non-significant coefficient estimates 
for these interaction terms.   
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to examine the markets’ ability to correctly forecast earnings management to avoid small losses 
when analysts are exhibiting apparent difficulties.  To this end, we consider relative market 
forecast error when analysts forecast zero earnings and when firms report zero earnings.  
Lacking explicit market forecasts, we focus on market returns and obtain results suggestive of 
higher returns and thus reduced market optimism when analysts forecast zero earnings.  Less 
optimistic market expectations at zero analyst forecasts contrasts with the greater optimism 
observed in analyst zero earnings forecasts relative to other small earnings forecasts.  For zero 
earnings realizations, we obtain limited evidence of investors exhibiting relative optimism late in 
the year and pessimism early in the year.   
Our regression tests yield significant evidence of a shift in earnings response coefficients 
only at the 271-360 day horizon, suggesting a relative difference in analyst and investor 
expectations of earnings management to avoid losses early in the year, and then a convergence of 
expectations.  These regression results indicate that at the longest horizon markets are unusually 
less optimistic than analysts when analysts forecast zero earnings.  Collectively, our 
distributional and regression tests suggest that at least at the longest horizon investors can make 
adjustments to correct for the relative analyst forecast optimism at analysts zero earnings 
forecasts. 
A particularly interesting finding in this paper is the observed differential discrepancy 
between market and analyst expectations of earnings.  Analysts represent a small subset of the 
market, and are subject to a variety of forces that are not perfectly aligned with the pursuit of 
market returns.  Markets can draw on a broader set of information and competitive analyses.  
Furthermore there is some evidence that analysts might not always be reporting their true 
expectations regarding firm performance.  Thus we do not expect markets to blindly align with 
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analyst reported expectations.  In this sense it is not entirely surprising that market and analyst 
reported expectations might differ.  While we have considered the potential for differences in the 
context of zero earnings forecasts and realizations, further research is needed to identify 
additional circumstances where analyst forecasts may provide particularly poor proxies for 
market expectations.   
The remaining benchmarks of last period’s earnings and analyst forecasts offer opportunities 
for future research.  Research targeting differences in analyst and investor perceptions of forecast 
and earnings management to meet or beat analyst forecasts may prove especially interesting.  Keung 
el al. (2010) show that investors can react relatively negatively to firms meeting or beating the 
analyst earnings forecast by a cent or less per share.  This result could reflect investor skepticism, as 
Keung et al. propose, as well as error in presuming an equivalency between investor and analyst 
expectations.  If investors are more optimistic than analysts when firms just meet or beat the analyst 
forecast, then we should expect relatively negative returns at these observations.  That said, this 
venue may present particular difficulties for if firms can manage forecasts as well as earnings we 
have the additional issue of assessing differences in investor and analyst responses to forecast 
management.   
A substantial benefit to our current consideration of earnings management to avoid small 
losses is that it abrogates the need to directly consider earnings forecast guidance in relation to the 
benchmark of zero earnings.  While such guidance and the endogenous nature of forecasts may play 
a role in considering management to avoid negative earnings surprises, where the benchmark is 
subject to guidance, such guidance cannot play a role in determining the benchmark for loss 
avoidance, since the zero earnings benchmark is not in itself subject to management.  A similar 
argument can be made for consideration of earnings management to avoid an earnings decrease, for 
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here again the benchmark is not subject to manipulation across the earnings forecast horizon.  
Unfortunately, the extremely low incidence of forecasted and realized zero changes in earnings 
presents substantial difficulties for tests relating to this benchmark.   
Finally, it would certainly be interesting to consider differences in analyst and market 
expectations in instances of firms simultaneously achieving more than one of the three major 
earnings benchmarks.   Here the relatively low incidence of simultaneously achieving more than one 
of the benchmarks creates substantial difficulties for any tests. 
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Figure 2. Quartiles of Earnings Forecast Error by Forecast Earnings, Scaled by Market Value 







     
    Market Value Scaled Forecast Earnings Interval 
 
   Q1 
   Median 
   Q3 
   Q3 
   Q1 
   Median 
   Q1 
   Median 
   Q3 
   Q3 
  
    32
Figure 3. Quartiles of Earnings Forecast Error by Realized Earnings, Scaled by Market Value 






    
                                         Market Value Scaled Earnings Interval 
 
 
   Q1 
   Q3 
   Median 
   Q1 
   O3 
   Q3 
   Q1 
   Median 
   Median 
  
    33








    Market Value Scaled Forecast Earnings Interval 
   Median 
   Q1 
   Q3 
   Q3 
   Median 
   Q1 
   Q3 
   Median 
   Q1 
  
    34







              Market Value Scaled Earnings Interval 
   Q3 
   Q1 
  Median 
  Median 
   Q3 
   Q1 
  Median 
   Q1 
   Q3 
  
    35
TABLE 1 
Sample sizes, distributions by year and industry, and mean and median number of forecasts 
contributing to forecast medians. 
 
Panel A: Sample Sizes for Various Tests 
 
Forecast       Distribution        Distribution      Equation (1)     Equation (2) 
Horizons       Comparisons      Comparisons 
        Forecasts         Actual Earnings 
     Last   21,210  20,700  16,375  16,038 
      1-90 Days  16,575  16,311  16,300  16,038 
     91-180 Days  18,564  18,878  14,810  15,196 
     181-270 Days  17,512  18,925  13,806  15,164 
      271-360 Days  16,298  18,886  12,638  14,973 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year for Distribution Comparisons for 1-90 Day Forecast Horizon.   
 
  Year         Observations 
  1983     164 
1984     308 
1985     307 
1986     393 
  1987     360 
  1988     329  
  1989     293 
  1990     415 
  1991     413  
  1992     532 
  1993     667 
  1994     717 
  1995     645 
  1996     829 
  1997  1,025 
  1998  1,171 
  1999    891 
  2000    859 
  2001    982 
  2002    925 
  2003    743 
  2004    846 
  2005    972 
  2006    900 
  2007              889 
  Total           16,575          
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Sample Distribution by Industry for Distribution Comparisons for 1-90 Day Forecast 
Horizon. 
 
Industry           Observations 
Agriculture and Natural Resources       35 
Mining and Construction   1,261 
Manufacturing     2,737  
Manufacturing     5,844 
Transportation and Communications       192 
Wholesale                 1,957 
Real Estate and other Investment Offices     423 
Services and Other     4,126 
   Total               16,575 
 
 
Panel D: Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of the Number of Forecasts per Firm-Year 
 
Forecast Horizon     Mean        Median             Std. Dev. 
1-90 Days     6.15  3  7.58 
91-180 Days   10.66  7            10.97 
181-270 Days   10.39  7            10.69 
271-360 Days   10.57  7            11.00 
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TABLE 2 






lastE 360,1ˆ  
 
medianE 180,91ˆ  
 
medianE 360,271ˆ  
 n  Q1 Med. Q3 n  Q1 Med. Q3 n  Q1 Med. Q3 
-0.0275  392 -.012 -.001 .004 336 -.019 -.003 .004 252 -.058 -.011 .007 
-0.0225 397 -.014 -.001 .003 352 -.018 -.003 .002 238 -.062 -.011 .003 
-0.0175 463 -.014 -.001 .003 387 -.020 -.003 .002 229 -.055 -.016 .000 
-0.0125 532 -.001 -.001 .003 415 -.021 -.003 .001 273 -.044 -.010 .001 
-0.0075 538 -.009 .000 .003 456 -.014 -.002 .001 314 -.037 -.010 .001 
-0.0025 566 -.009 .000 .002 479 -.013 -.002 .001 305 -.038 -.010 .002 
0.0000 385 -.055 -.001 .002 237 -.059 -.021 .000 206 -.127 -.031 .006 
0.0025 706 -.004 .000 .002 633 -.010 -.001 .001 455 -.032 -.007 .001 
0.0075 920 -.005 .000 .002 779 -.009 -.001 .001 616 -.030 -.006 .002 
0.0125 1095 -.003 .000 .003 930 -.008 -.000 .002 755 -.027 -.004 .003 
0.0175 1315 -.003 .000 .003 1098 -.008 -.000 .002 956 -.031 -.005 .003 
0.0225 1516 -.003 .000 .003 1288 -.006 -.000 .002 1174 -.020 -.003 .003 
0.0275 1726 -.003 .000 .002 1518 -.006 -.000 .001 1381 -.020 -.002 .003 
 
*  Earnings and forecasts are from I/B/E/S, and are scaled by beginning of year market value.  Forecast error = 
actual earnings – forecast.  Earnings intervals are of width .005, except the for .000 where all earnings equal 
.000.  Earnings forecasts employ the following measures  
     lastE 360,1ˆ    : last individual analyst forecast issued before the announcement of earnings 
     medianE 180,91ˆ  : median of forecasts issued from  91-180 days prior to earnings announcement  
     medianE 360,271ˆ : median of forecasts issued from 271 and 360 days prior earnings announcement  
    n = number of observations. 
   Q1= First quartile forecast error. 
   Med. = Median forecast error.  
 Q3= Third quartile forecast error. 
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TABLE 3 







lastE 360,1ˆ  
 
medianE 180,91ˆ  
 
medianE 360,271ˆ  
 n  Q1 Med. Q3 N  Q1 Med. Q3 n  Q1 Med. Q3 
-.0275 401 -.020 -.003 .002 354 -.027 -.006 .001 351 -.071 -.032 -.006 
-.0225 456 -.020 -.002 .002 385 -.024 -.006 -.001 402 -.070 -.036 -.008 
-.0175 481 -.014 -.002 .003 417 -.023 -.005 001 439 -.070 -.038 -.011 
-.0125 517 -.013 -.001 .002 460 -.020 -.005 001 467 -.051 -.027 -.006 
-.0075 531 -.010 -.001 .002 487 -.015 -.003 .001 474 -.054 -.025 -.007 
-.0025 505 -.006 -.000 .002 458 -.013 -.002 .001 460 -.048 -.020 -.004 
.0000 149 -.009 .000 .004 127 -.012 -.003 .002 126 -.057 -.025 -.006 
.0025 800 -.008 -.000 .001 738 -.019 -.004 .000 710 -.052 -.025 -.005 
.0075 952 -.008 .000 .002 853 -.014 -.002 .001 863 -.042 -.017 -.003 
.0125 1048 -.006 .000 .002 947 -.011 -.002 .001 935 -.036 -.015 -.002 
.0175 1304 -.015 .000 .002 1179 -.011 -.001 .001 1168 -.037 -.015 -.002 
.0225 1443 -.005 .000 .002 1309 -.009 -.001 .001 1318 -.029 -.010 -.000 
.0275 1656 -.003 .000 .002 1525 -.007 -.001 .001 1512 -.025 -.008 .001 
 
* Earnings and forecasts are from I/B/E/S, and are scaled by beginning of year market value.  Forecast error = 
actual earnings – forecast.  Earnings intervals are of width .005, except the for .000 where all earnings  equal 
.000.  Earnings forecasts employ the following measures:   
    lastE 360,1ˆ     : last individual analyst forecast issued before the announcement of earnings 
    medianE 180,91ˆ  : median of forecasts issued from 91-180 days prior to earnings announcement  
    medianE 360,271ˆ  : median of forecasts issued from 271 and 360 days prior earnings announcement  
    n = number of observations. 
   Q1= First quartile forecast error. 
   Med. = Median forecast error.  
 Q3= Third quartile forecast error. 
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TABLE 4 






lastE 360,1ˆ  
 
medianE 180,91ˆ  
 
medianE 360,271ˆ  
 n  Q1 Med. Q3 N  Q1 Med. Q3 n  Q1 Med. Q3 
-.0275 392 -.047 -.002 .051 336 -.167 -.012 .135 252 -.617 -.181 .154 
-.0225 397 -.060 .013 .037 352 -.197 -.032 .158 238 -.404 -.166 .180 
-.0175 463 -.062 -.014 .029 387 -.215 -.041 .146 229 -.399 -.155 .234 
-.0125 532 -.061 -.012 .041 415 -.186 -.031 .160 273 -.437 -.184 .183 
-.0075 538 -.052 -.009 .044 456 -.188 -.033 .184 314 -.438 -.173 .129 
-.0025 566 -.047 -.005 .043 479 -.199 -.047 .137 305 -.494 -.194 .186 
.0000 385 -.039 -.003 .041 237 -.172 -.039 .113 206 -.282 -.089 .227 
.0025 706 -.056 -.009 .040 633 -.186 -.022 .162 455 -.408 -.148 .187 
.0075 920 -.049 -.007 .040 779 -.173 -.027 .141 616 -.349 -.144 .131 
.0125 1095 -.043 -.001 .044 930 -.156 -.011 .135 755 -.361 -.116 .196 
.0175 1315 -.041 -.001 .041 1098 -.153 -.022 .122 956 -.332 -.107 .166 
.0225 1516 -.041 .001 .048 1288 -.158 -.026 .116 1174 -.343 -.087 .181 
.0275 1726 -.038 .001 .042 1518 -.138 -.023 .119 1381 -.325 -.093 .154 
 
* Market adjusted returns (relative to the CRSP value-weighted index) are from the end of the forecast interval of 
interest to the day after the earnings release date. For the last forecasts, we begin the returns interval the day 
before the earnings announcement.  Earnings and forecasts are from I/B/E/S , and are scaled by beginning of year 
market value.  Forecast error = actual earnings – forecast.  Market value scaled earnings forecast intervals are of 
width .005, except for .000 where the forecast is .000.  Earnings forecasts employ the following measures:   
    lastE 360,1ˆ    : last individual analyst forecast issued before the announcement of earnings 
    medianE 180,91ˆ  : median of forecasts issued from 91-180 days prior to earnings announcement  
    medianE 360,271ˆ  : median of forecasts issued from 271 and 360 days prior earnings announcement  
    n = number of observations. 
   Q1= First quartile market adjusted returns . 
   Med. = Median market adjusted returns.  
 Q3= Third quartile market adjusted returns. 
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TABLE 5 
Quartiles of market adjusted returns by earnings level and forecast horizon* 
 
Earnings 
Interval   
Mid Point  
 
lastE 360,1ˆ  
 
medianE 180,91ˆ  
 
medianE 360,271ˆ  
 n  Q1 Med. Q3 N  Q1 Med. Q3 n  Q1 Med. Q3 
-.0275 401 -.054 -.009 .041 354 -.185 -.040 .126 351 -.466 -.236 .042 
-.0225 456 -.069 -.018 .031 385 -.217 -.067 .107 402 -.469 -.254 .012 
-.0175 481 -.056 -.014 .033 417 -.201 -.046 .147 439 -.480 -.268 .043 
-.0125 517 -.055 -.012 .042 460 -.209 -.054 .122 467 -.463 -.234 .020 
-.0075 531 -.052 -.008 .034 487 -.176 -.025 .140 474 -.452 -.211 .023 
-.0025 505 -.047 .005 .048 458 -.203 -.043 .143 460 -.415 -.211 .037 
.0000 149 -.047 -.001 .020 127 -.190 -.029 .161 126 -.345 -.205 .069 
.0025 800 -.045 -.004 .043 738 -.167 -.027 .120 710 -.444 -.220 .046 
.0075 952 -.040 -.003 .037 853 -.153 -.031 .125 863 -.410 -.193 .051 
.0125 1048 -.050 -.007 .034 947 -.177 -.020 .121 935 -.400 -.181 .091 
.0175 1304 -.044 -.004 .041 1179 -.162 -.029 .105 1168 -.375 -.179 .058 
.0225 1443 -.041 -.002 .046 1309 -.162 -.027 .120 1318 -.355 -.136 .096 
.0275 1656 -.041 -.001 .040 1525 -.143 -.024 .108 1512 -.337 -.137 .099 
 
* Market adjusted returns (relative to the CRSP value-weighted index) are from the end of the forecast interval of 
interest to the day after the earnings release date. For the last forecasts, we begin the returns interval the day 
before the earnings announcement. Earnings and forecasts are from the I/B/E/S database, and are scaled by 
beginning of year market value.   Forecast error = actual earnings – forecast.  Market value scaled earnings 
intervals are of width .005, except for .000 where market value scaled earnings is .000.  Earnings forecasts 
employ the following forecasts:   
    lastE 360,1ˆ  : last individual analyst forecast issued before the announcement of earnings 
    medianE 180,91ˆ  : median of forecasts issued from 91-180 days prior to earnings announcement  
    medianE 360,271ˆ  : median of forecasts issued from 271 and 360 days prior earnings announcement  
    n = number of observations. 
 Q1= First quartile market adjusted returns. 
   Med. = Median market adjusted returns.  
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TABLE 6 
Regression of market-adjusted buy and hold returns on forecast error with a zero forecast dummy 
variable* 
 
Panel A.  D1=1 if the earnings forecast is zero, = 0 otherwise. 
 
RET = ß0 + ß1*FE + ß2*D1 + ß3*FE*D1 + ß4*DLOSS + ß5*DMBE + ß6*MB + ß7*LEV  
+ ß8*BETA + ß9*SIZE + ß10*PERSIST + ß11*FE*DLOSS +  ß12*FE*DMBE 
+ ß13*FE*MB + ß14*FE*LEV + ß15*FE*BETA + ß16*FE*SIZE +ß17*FE* PERSIST + e         (1) 
 
 
* RET is the market adjusted return (relative to CRSP value-weighted index) in the interval from the end of a 
forecast interval of interest to the day after the earnings release date,  
FE is reported less median forecasted earnings scaled by the market value of equity, for all horizons except last.    
DLOSS is 1 if earnings is less than zero, otherwise = 0, 
DMBE is 1 if FE is > 0, otherwise = 0, 
MB is the market to book equity at the end of the year, 
LEV is long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt plus preferred and common equity, 
BETA is market beta based on CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets, and 
PERSIST is a measure of earnings persistence, based on E/P ratio decile -- 1 for the decile ranking 3 to 8 and 0 for 
the rankings 1, 2, 9, and 10. 
Significance levels are based on clustering errors at the firm and year level and are denoted by *, **, and ***, for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (Petersen 2009). 
 
Forecast Horizon Last 1-90 Days 91-180 Days 181-270 Days 271-360 Days 
Intercept -.019*** -.021*** -.095*** -.223*** -.323*** 
FE -.030 -.151 .871*** 3.587*** 6.717*** 
D1 .009 .010* .011 -.042 .039 
FE*D1 .042 -.007 .132 -1.280 -.694*** 
DLOSS -.004* -.003 .032 .015 -.003 
DMBE .028*** .028*** .084*** .107*** .131*** 
MB -.000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
LEV .001 .000 .001 -.002 -.006 
BETA .000 .000 -.002 -.004 -.003 
SIZE .000 .001 -.002 -.003 -.008 
PERSIST .001 .002 .067*** .205*** .343*** 
FE*DLOSS .020 .081 -.293 -2.776*** -5.826*** 
FE*DMBE .144 .254 .279 .197 .362* 
FE*MB -.001 -.000 .001 .000 .019 
FE*LEV -.025 -.004 -.003 .074 .133 
FE*BETA -.002 .001 -.020 -.057* .012 
FE*SIZE .005 .011 -.090 -.101**        -.199*** 
FE*PERSIST -.082* -.081 .938** 1.180** 1.473*** 
      
Sample Size 16375 16300 14810 13806 12638 
R2 .024 .024 .035 .072 .106 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Panel B.  D2=1 if the earnings is zero, = 0 otherwise. 
 
RET = ß0 + ß1*FE + ß2*D2 + ß3*FE*D2 + ß4*DLOSS + ß5*DMBE + ß6*MB + ß7*LEV   
+ ß8*BETA + ß9*SIZE + ß10*PERSIST +  ß11*FE*DLOSS  +  ß12*FE*DMBE 
+ ß13*FE*MB + ß14*FE*LEV + ß15*FE*BETA + ß16*FE*SIZE + ß17* FE*PERSIST +  e     (2) 
 
 
* RET is the market adjusted return (relative to CRSP value-weighted index) in the interval from the end of a 
forecast interval of interest to the day after the earnings release date,  
FE is reported less median forecasted earnings scaled by the market value of equity, for all horizons except last.    
DLOSS is 1 if earnings is less than zero, otherwise = 0, 
DMBE is 1 if FE is > 0, otherwise = 0, 
MB is the market to book equity at the end of the year, 
LEV is long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt plus preferred and common equity, 
BETA is market beta based on CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets, and 
PERSIST is a measure of earnings persistence, based on E/P ratio decile -- 1 for the decile ranking 3 to 8 and 0 for 
the rankings 1, 2, 9, and 10. 
Significance levels are based on clustering errors at the firm and year level and are denoted by *, **, and ***, for 




Forecast Horizon Last 1-90 Days 91-180 Days 181-270 Days 271-360 Days 
Intercept -.026*** -.027*** -.117*** -.292*** -.357*** 
FE -.133 -.299*** 1.104* 1.273* 4.064*** 
D2 -.005 -.006 -.020 .069 .384** 
FE*D2 -.067 -.068 -.119 -.096 6.085* 
DLOSS -.002 -.002 .044** .067** .051 
DMBE .027*** .027*** .088*** .142*** .165*** 
MB -.000 -.000 .000 .000 .000 
LEV .000 .000 .002 -.001 -.005 
BETA .001 .000 -.002 -.005 -.005 
SIZE .001** .001** -.001 .004 .002 
PERSIST .004** .005** .078*** .184*** .259*** 
FE*DLOSS .070 .004 .630** 1.138** -.397 
FE*DMBE .216** .362*** 2.099*** 3.668*** 3.423*** 
FE*MB .000 -.000 .004 .002 .003 
FE*LEV -.023*** -.017** -.153 -1.083*** -.375 
FE*BETA -.019 -.016 -.150** -.236** -.242** 
FE*SIZE .012 .017 -.281*** -.089 -.357*** 
FE*PERSIST .138* .258*** 1.622*** 1.149** 1.322*** 
      
Sample Size 16038 16038 15196 15164 14973 
R2 .025 .025 .045 .081 .099 
